Social Policy:Problem Solving Gaps, Partial Exits and Court-Decision Traps by Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg & Falkner, Gerda
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Social Policy
Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Falkner, Gerda
Published in:
The EU's Decision Traps
Publication date:
2011
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Martinsen, D. S., & Falkner, G. (2011). Social Policy: Problem Solving Gaps, Partial Exits and Court-Decision
Traps. In G. Falkner (Ed.), The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies (pp. 128-145). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
1 
 
Social Policy: 
Problem-solving Gaps, Partial Exits and Court-decision Traps 
 
Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Gerda Falkner 
(2011)  
In Gerda Falkner (ed.) The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 128-145, 
 
 
Abstract: 
Notwithstanding some persisting, and probably irresolvable, problem solving gaps, Social Europe 
escaped the joint-decision trap quite regularly. Treaty-base games and arena shifting, most 
importantly, helped to bring about more secondary law and more ECJ driven political decisions 
than might have been expected from looking at the decision rules. Furthermore, some progressive 
steps in European social integration driven by a “court-decision trap” can be seen. Two examples 
are studied in-depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum 
benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding 
fathers of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for 
healthcare, or to open social assistance related benefits for exportability. 
 
Keywords: Social policy, European integration, European Court of Justice, Treaty-base game, arena 
shifting. 
 
I. European Social Integration: The Sectoral Problematique 
This area is characterised by an expert consensus that market-making would not suffice in the frame 
of European integration. The social and labour law systems of the member states are affected to a 
significant extent by the intensified competition in the enlarged EU market. This needs to be taken 
into consideration when drafting general EU policies, and it needs some active counter-steering 
with EU-level social regulation. The extent of the latter, however, has been and is very much 
contested. 
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Measured against the Commission’s proposals, the EU managed to close a major expectations-
capability gap during the 1990s, when practically all of the pending legislative proposals from prior 
decades were finally processed. Moreover, and maybe unexpectedly, the legislative process did not 
stall, at least before the 2007 enlargement. In 2009, approximately 80 binding norms existed in the 
three main fields of EU social regulation: health and safety, other working conditions, and equality 
at the workplace and beyond (see data presented in (Falkner 2010)).
1
 However, the increasing 
amount of labour law provisions imposing minimum standards to be applied throughout the EU 
may not answer all of the existing challenges in the larger field of social policy. Reconciling the 
legal gaps ensuing from the unified market is one yardstick for measuring the EU’s social 
dimension, with another being the exploitation of problem solving potentials that nowadays no 
nation state may enjoy on its own. 
Beyond specific aspects of the social and labour law systems being touched by the EU, there is a 
suspicion that the playing field between labour and industry may have been growing less level than 
ever, not the least due to European integration. The basic argument is that mobile production factors 
such as capital can profit comparatively more from the enlarged market, whereas labour might 
suffer from increased competitive pressures both directly (wage dumping) and indirectly (cross-
border tax competition tends to disburden the more mobile factors from their share of the social 
security and tax contributions). Within labour, the “Services Directive” accepts a degree of 
inequality for those workers posted to other member states, since for them many of their (often 
cheaper) home country regulations apply (see Schmidt in this volume, Schmidt 2009). Additionally, 
controversial ECJ cases have recently touched the borderlines between market freedoms and basic 
social rights such as union action. Their consequences will only be visible in the years to come. A 
heated debate is ongoing as to their potential consequences in terms of domestic social and 
industrial relations systems, in particular concerning the minimum pay of workers and the right to 
strike if foreign companies providing services, e.g. in the building sector, are not subject to the 
same rules respected by domestic employers (or at least the majority thereof) in the country of work 
(Scharpf 2009, Joerges and Rödl, 2008). 
In short, it can be argued that the EU’s measures in the social realm have performed relatively well 
if compared to the more ambitious task of completing the social directives proposed by the 
                                                 
1
 Additionally, approximately 90 amendments and geographical extensions to such binding norms have been adopted 
(e.g. to new member states). On top of these binding EU social norms come approximately 120 non-binding policy 
outputs, e.g. soft recommendations to the member states. 
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Commission during the activist phases up to the early 1990s. However, they clearly fall very short 
of the more far-reaching conceptions of a “social Europe”. There is a suspicion shared by many 
authors that ‘member governments have lost more control over national welfare policies … than the 
EU has gained de facto in transferred authority’ (Leibfried 2005, see also Scharpf 1999, Ferrera, 
2005). At the same time, designing far-reaching counter-steering measures is not easy considering 
that the EU is not a nation state with re-distributive solidarity as a given, and that whatever the EU 
does is in addition to national social systems. In functional terms, there is hence policy pre-emption, 
and the national politicians furthermore tend to claim the ‘social’ to be a domestic prerogative (see 
in more detail Falkner 2010). 
Notwithstanding these persisting, and probably irresolvable, problem solving gaps, Social Europe 
escaped the joint-decision trap in many (though not all) cases. More secondary law and more ECJ 
driven political decisions can be found than might have been expected from looking at the decision 
rules. Furthermore, some progressive steps in European social integration driven by a “court-
decision trap” can be seen (Falkner 2011): even when they all agree, the governments do not 
manage to roll back ECJ decisions. This goes far beyond the finding that some EU social policy 
initiatives had surpassed the lowest common denominator of member state preferences (see Pierson 
and Leibfried 1995). 
One early example was the direct applicability of Article 119 EEC-Treaty on equal pay for women 
and men which the member states had not implemented for almost two decades when the first cases 
reached the ECJ. Two more recent examples will be studied in-depth in this chapter, on health care 
and on the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits.
2
 From the viewpoint 
of (at least some of the) consumers/patients/EU-citizens, one can say that there was a problem-
solving gap: they were denied their rights to the free provision of services and benefits. This gap 
has been closed, at least partially, although neither the founding fathers of the Treaties, nor the 
governments were willing to create a cross-border market for healthcare, or to open social 
assistance related benefits for exportability. From the perspective of the governments, the ECJ did 
create a problem, rather than solving one, by dissociating the distribution of social benefits from the 
latter’s financial basis.3 
 
                                                 
2
 Social minimum benefits do in many cases resemble social assistance benefits and will therefore also be termed social 
assistance related benefits in the following.  
3
 Thanks to Fritz W. Scharpf for this formulation. 
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II. Exits from the trap and consensus-promoting mechanisms at play  
EU social policy is a rich field from which to harvest examples for exit mechanisms from the joint-
decision trap. We will in this section study some of them based on two of the mechanisms specified 
in this book’s conceptual chapter: changes of opportunity structures (A) and changes of decision 
rules under the joint-decision mode (B). The focus will then, in the subsequent sections III and IV, 
be placed on supranational-hierarchical steering by the ECJ, since here we can present two 
examples for extreme cases where all governments’ wills have been overruled. 
A) Changes of opportunity structures 
Historically, the first obvious use of the strategy to change the opportunity structure for 
governments was during the mid-1970s in the field of gender equality. The ECJ had by then 
established not only the potential direct effect of EEC Treaty provisions, but also that the Treaty 
could bind private actors – though not yet in the field of gender equality. Against this background, 
the EU Commission managed to nudge the Council into adopting, first of all, the Equal Pay 
Directive, and later also a broader framework for non-discrimination at the workplace. One of the 
effective arguments used by the Commission was the pending cases before the ECJ and that high 
costs might otherwise result for employers in the member states, or at least for the governments as 
employers (Falkner 1994). Issues of legal certainty, as discussed in Susanne K. Schmidt’s chapter, 
were raised. It should be mentioned, however, that in the first relevant case (Defrenne I, C- 
80/1970, ECJ 1971:447) the ECJ had actually not spoken in favour of equality and had not 
answered some of the relevant questions asked, which is difficult to understand in the light of later 
doctrines. In fact, the supra-national hierarchical mode could have been chosen in this field much 
earlier. The Commission, most importantly, could have enforced Article 119 via Treaty 
infringement proceedings, which it chose not to do. The truly supranational-hierarchical modes 
actually needed long time horizons to mature, even in fields with obvious shortcomings on the part 
of the member states. 
Meanwhile, equality has developed into one of three major fields of EU social regulation. Further 
matters, such as the equal treatment of men and women regarding working conditions and social 
security, and even the issue of burden of proof in discrimination law suits, were over time regulated 
at the EU level (Hoskyns 1996; Ostner and Lewis 1995). Soon after the adoption of the Equal Pay 
Directive in 1975, the ECJ actually held that Article 119  ‘is at once economic and social’  and 
formed  ‘part of the foundations of the Community’  and could hence be relied on before the 
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national courts, even against collective agreements and contracts between individuals (ECJ case 
43/75, Defrenne II, ECJ 1976: 60-77). None of the governments had in 1957 imagined that twenty 
years later, national law and individual work contracts might be invalidated by legal complaints 
under Article 119, whose wording was specifically drafted to oblige each of the member states (not 
the Community!) to ensure the principle of equal pay. This is actually a much older example of 
what sections III and IV will outline, too: European social integration against the will of all 
governments. 
Another strategy from the menu of “changing opportunity structures” is co-optation of strategic 
partners to pressurise governments. Here it is important to mention that the Commission served as a 
kind of midwife in the birth of the European Trade Union movement. Without Commission support 
in terms of practical and financial means, much of later campaigning and even social partner 
negotiations would not have occurred. Such processes of polity creation occurred at least twice: By 
the time of the establishment of the ETUC, and later preceding the Maastricht Social Agreement. 
During the early decades, setting up the ETUC and funding it were crucial; later, it was a degree of 
supra-nationalisation of the internal rules of procedure without which the corporatist negotiations 
under the Maastricht Social Chapter’s provisions could not have worked even to a limited extent 
(Falkner 1998). 
 
B) Changes of Decision Rules: Treaty base game and arena shifting 
The dominant philosophy of the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC Treaty) was that welfare would be provided by the economic growth stemming from the 
economics of a liberalised market. Welfare was not foreseen to arise from the regulatory and (re-) 
distributive capacity of a public policy at the European level. For a long time the EEC (and later the 
EC) possessed no explicit competence provision empowering the Commission to draft legislative 
proposals for later adoption by the Council of Ministers. It was only due to the existence of so-
called 'subsidiary competence provisions' that intervention in the social policy field was – implicitly 
– made possible, but only if it was considered functional for market integration (most importantly, 
Article 100 EEC Treaty and Article 235 EEC Treaty). It is crucial to note that from the 1970s 
onwards these provisions provided a loophole for social policy harmonisation at the EU level. The 
necessary unanimity, however, constituted high thresholds for joint action. Adopting social 
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regulation in the Council of Ministers needed unanimous approval. Given the often antagonistic 
preferences of the governments, there was a severe form of joint-decision trap situation. 
However, the 1986 Single European Act introduced a provision selectively allowing for qualified 
majority voting on minimum harmonisation concerning health and safety of workers (to become 
Article118a ECT). Reluctant member states, most importantly the UK whose Prime Minister 
Thatcher had thought this provision on health and safety would be too technical to matter, could for 
now be forced to align their social legislation with the majority of member states, even against their 
will. An extensive use of this provision was possible because the wording and even key terms of 
Article 118a were unclear. This made it easy to play what has since been called the ‘treaty base 
game’ (Rhodes 1995). It allowed the governments to adopt not only measures improving the 
working environment, such as a directive on the maximum concentration of air-borne pollutants, 
but also measures which ensured the health and safety of workers by improving working conditions 
in a much more general sense like, for example, limiting working time. A large part of the social 
policy directives adopted by the EC during the 1990s came into being via this "escape from 
deadlock" (Héritier 1999). 
Where EU social policy-making is difficult to manage, another potential escape route is arena 
shifting to social partners. This was initiated by the EU Commission who acted as a mediator 
between the governments, on the one hand, and the social partners, on the other. Since 1992, 
bargaining on social policy issues has therefore been pursued in two quite distinctive but 
interdependent arenas: the Council and its working groups; and the organised interests of 
management and labour. In this ‘corporatist policy community’ (Falkner 1998), the Commission 
consults on any planned social policy measure. European-level employer and labour groups may 
then inform the Commission of their wish to initiate negotiations on the matter under discussion in 
order to reach a collective agreement. This process brings standard EC decision making to a stand-
still for nine months. If a collective agreement is signed, it can, at the joint request of the 
signatories, be incorporated in a Council decision on the basis of a prior Commission proposal.  
The practical effectiveness of this potential exit from the joint-decision trap, however, depends on 
the willingness to compromise on the part of the so-called social partners. As it turns out, the 
employers’ representatives seem only willing to compromise “in the shadow of the law” and/or 
where their self-interest in upholding the corporatist procedures are at stake. Not many social 
regulation issues have fit these criteria in almost 20 years. Only three legally binding, cross-sectoral 
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collective agreements on labour law issues have been signed and were implemented in directives: 
on parental leave (December 1995; reformed in 2009 and again implemented via Council directive); 
on part-time work (June 1997); and on fixed-term work (March 1999). A number of further 
negotiations failed to reach agreement or were not even initiated (e.g. on fighting sexual 
harassment, and on information and consultation of employees in national enterprises). Recently, a 
few further agreements were concluded to be implemented only in accordance with the procedures 
and practices specific to individual countries, rather than by a Council directive (e.g., on telework, 
work-related stress, and on harassment at work). In short, EU social policy represents a 
paradigmatic example for arena shifting and hence changing the decision-mode under the EU’s 
political decision-making framework. A panacea this is certainly not. 
We hypothesise that one could find examples for all other aspects discussed in the conceptual 
chapter as potential exits from the trap, too, such as delegation to de-politicised committees. 
Furthermore, some of the consensus-promoting mechanisms as outlined in the conceptual chapters 
have clearly been present at least at times. Changes in government, for sure, have had clear effects, 
the most blatant of which is the accession of the UK to the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty. 
John Major had allowed a twin-track Europe to exist which the Labour Party put an end to as soon 
as it took over government (Falkner 1998). This story can at the same time serve as an example for 
how opt-outs are being used, a further one being the Working Time Directive and its – though still 
unsuccessful – successors. 
In the rest of the chapter, however, we will focus on what we consider to be the most interesting 
aspect of how supranational dynamics have driven EU social policy forwards, even against the 
explicit will of ALL governments. 
 
III. Court-decision trap I: Healthcare as a cross-border service in the EU 
As laid down in the constitutional design of the European Community, internal market principles 
were never meant to affect the member states’ organisation of healthcare. As confirmed by Treaty 
Article 152 (5) (TEC)
4
 and long taken for granted by national politicians, the delivery and 
organisation of healthcare was set as member state competence. Loud was the outcry therefore, 
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 Now article 168 (7) of the Lisbon Treaty.  
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when the European Court of Justice in April 1998 ruled on the two seminal cases of Decker
5
 and 
Kohll
6
. This laid down that healthcare also is defined as a service within the meaning of the Treaty. 
The former German health minister Seehofer was one of the most severe critics of the ruling and its 
implications, stating that this new case-law was revolutionary and if Germany adopted its premises, 
it would be a long-term threat to the sustainability of the German health system (Spiegel 17/98, 
Fokus from 4 May 1998). A Treaty amendment detailing that internal market principles did not 
apply to healthcare was called for.  
As we now know, such a Treaty amendment was never adopted. In the end, member states did not 
prioritise the matter sufficiently when negotiating the Treaty of Nice, and instead chose a strategy of 
neglect. Meanwhile, the principles and rights of the European Union are increasingly impacting on 
key aspects of national healthcare organisation. Although there is still no political agreement on the 
scope and content of EU cross border healthcare, it is safe to conclude that despite firm political 
preferences against European healthcare integration, it nevertheless has progressively taken place  
with considerable speed and substance (Martinsen 2005; 2009).  
From its seminal judgements in 1998 onwards, the ECJ has been conducting non-political decision-
making. In the context of the judgements, a central question has been the conditions under which 
free movement would apply without restrictions. Due to the EU social security coordination scheme 
Regulation 883/2004, which will be treated further in section IV below, member states are entitled 
to limit cross-border care by means of ‘prior authorisation policies’ (Reg. 883/2004, Art. 20). Such 
policies state that if a patient wishes to obtain planned treatment in another member state, the 
competent national institution must authorise or refuse the patient permission to go abroad for 
treatment beforehand, and thus certify that the cost of treatment will be reimbursed by the national 
authorities. Whether such prior authorisation requirement is a justifiable national restriction to the 
free movement principles of the EU is one of the main questions treated by the Court. Although 
apparently a rather specific and concrete question, this controversy mirrors one of the most central 
questions on European integration, namely the scope and limits of national control and 
competences.  
In the first cases of Decker and Kohll, the Court found that prior authorisation was not justified in 
the light of the internal market. But the cases concerned a pair of spectacles and dental treatment, 
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 Case C-120/95, Decker, 28 April 1998.  
 
6
 Case C-158/96, Kohll, 28 April 1998. 
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and the member states could therefore – after the initial outburst – reassure themselves that the 
judicial conclusions had only limited effect on healthcare goods and services provided outside the 
hospital sector and that they furthermore only concerned the Luxembourg healthcare system. 
Luxembourg has a social insurance system, where the cost of care is reimbursed and not provided 
as benefit in kind, and the general applicability of the Court’s conclusions could therefore be 
refused. 
In the subsequent cases, the scope of the initiated legal integration becomes gradually clearer. In the 
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms case
7
 the Court clarified that internal market principles also apply to 
hospital care, provided as benefits in kind. This time the Court ruled against the Dutch healthcare 
system and found that prior authorisation may be a justified barrier to the free movement principles 
when the service in question is hospital care. However, prior authorisation is only justified if 1) the 
decision on whether or not to grant treatment abroad is based on ‘international medical science’ and 
2) a similar treatment can be provided in the patient’s own member state without ‘undue delay’. 
Among other aspects this means that waiting lists as a means of capacity planning and to prioritise 
between treatments and – eventually – patients are conditioned and restricted by Community law.  
In the following case of Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, another Dutch case, the ECJ proceeds by 
drawing a distinction between hospital care and non-hospital care. For hospital care – prior 
authorisation may under certain condition be justified. For non-hospital care it is, however, found to 
be an unjustified barrier to the free circulation of services. In Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, the Court 
thus settled that for the wide scope of treatment which can be provided without hospitalisation
8
 
internal market principles rule. The impact of this legal reasoning is considerable indeed. It implies 
that for the wide scope of healthcare services that do not require hospitalisation, a patient can go to 
another member state without authorisation from his/her home state, pay for the cost of treatment 
up front and subsequently have the costs reimbursed back home – up to what a similar treatment 
would have cost in the home member state.  
So far only the impact on social insurance systems has been interpreted. In the 2006 Watts case
9
, the 
Court for the first time considered the implications for national health services purely organised and 
                                                 
7
 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, 12 July 2001. 
   
8
 Hospital care is understood as what requires a one night stay in hospital. According to this definition, treatment that 
can be provided within less than 24 hours counts as non-hospital care.  
 
9
 Case C-372/04, Watts, 16 May 2006.    
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financed by the public authorities and provided as benefits in kind. The case considered the UK 
National Health Service, the NHS. The Court concluded that the internal market principle applies to 
all healthcare systems, irrespective of how they are financed or how they provide healthcare. The 
Court repeated that patients have a right to cross border treatment if the waiting-time for a similar 
treatment in one’s own member state exceeds what is acceptable.  
The final case to be mentioned here considered the Greek administration of cross border treatment. 
In the 2007 case of Stamatelakis, the Court ruled that a member state cannot exclude reimbursing 
treatment in another member state on the grounds that it is provided in a private hospital. In the 
case, the Greek government submitted that the balance of the system is at risk if citizens can travel 
to private hospitals in EU countries without Greece having established agreements with those 
hospitals. However, these concerns were ruled out by the Court, which instead clarified that the 
Greek ban on reimbursement for private healthcare abroad is against Community law.  
The line of case law from Decker, Kohll onwards to Stamatelakis by and large draws the scope and 
the founding substance of an internal market for healthcare. Step by step, it has included all 
healthcare systems, public and private provisions and limits the justified scope of national 
conditions. It is not only an agenda set by law, but also the negotiable substance which becomes 
defined through judicial policy-making. It is clear that up to this point, it is indeed a European 
healthcare system left to be drawn by courts and consumers/patients (Leibfried 2005).  
Since then politics has come to the fore. Politicians in the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament are now in co-decision and by procedural means of qualified majority voting trying to 
reach a compromise. However, within the political room to manoeuvre, the ‘voice of law’ as put 
forward by the European Court of Justice continues to constitute an extremely important exit 
possibility. Indeed, from different actors and institutions the ‘voice of law’ is used strategically as a 
problem solving strategy to overcome opposition (for a more detailed account, see Martinsen 2009).  
The EP has been severely divided from the start. By and large, a left – right divide manifests itself 
on the matter. The European Socialists and the Greens are against the proposal, whereas the 
European Peoples Party and the Liberals are in favour. However, also in EP negotiations the case-
law of the Court is a strong argument why political action needs to be taken (Interviews, MEPs, 
February, June, December 2009). As the rapporteur John Bowis, from the European Peoples Party, 
puts forward in his report:  
11 
 
‘For the past ten years, since the 1998 Kohll and Decker judgement at the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the 
lawyers of Europe have been deciding policy on patient mobility, because the politicians of Europe have failed to do 
so. If we do nothing, the Court will continue to interpret the Treaties, where patient mobility rights are concerned. 
They will provide the clarity that we politicians have failed to provide. If we are content to leave policymaking to 
lawyers, then we need do nothing - except of course pay the resulting unpredictable bills’ (Report A6-0233/2009, 
rapporteur Bowis, p. 77). 
In the Council negotiations on cross-border healthcare, the presidency troika of France, the Czech 
Republic and Sweden formulated various compromise proposals and at the end of the Swedish 
presidency a compromise for a common position was on the table.
10
 It was, however, turned down 
by a blocking minority of Spain, Poland, Romania, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Lithuania. This means that for the time being the dossier is parked. The ‘voice of law’ 
has been crucial during Council negotiations, where the majority of member states agreed on the 
need to politically regulate in order to take over what the Court had initiated (Interviews I, II, III 
and IV, Council, December 2009). After the failure to reach a political agreement, the Swedish 
presidency stressed that the member states have now left it for the Court to continue (G. Hägglund, 
2980
th
 meeting, Press Conference, 1
st
 December).  
Although the exit possibilities established did not for the time being prove sufficient regarding cross 
border health care, the progression of negotiations should be noted. As noted by Commissioner 
Vassillou, only 2-3 member states were in favour when the proposal was first presented by the 
Commission (A. Vassillou, 2980
th
 meeting, Press Conference, 1
st
 December). In the meantime 
various veto points have been dismantled, and apparently the Swedish presidency came very close 
to reaching an agreement by qualified majority voting (Interviews, CON, December 2009).  
In sum, the case storyline so far is that member states initially wanted to keep cross border 
healthcare out of the EU regulatory scope, but the Court brought it in. Only a Treaty revision could 
have ‘rolled back the Court’, but member states chose to shelter behind a strategy of neglect, 
prioritising differently and holding that due to the specific circumstances of their domestic 
healthcare systems, the case-law did not really impact back home. For more than a decade, the 
European Court of Justice has progressively taken the policy field far into the regulatory space of 
the internal market. This form of supranational-hierarchical steering has finally made the 
Commission present a proposal for a patient mobility directive, and although ongoing negotiations 
have not yet reached an agreement, member states’ opposition is gradually being turned into an 
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 Swedish compromise proposal as of 23 October 2009, Council inter-institutional file no. 14926/09.  
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acceptance of an EU internal system for healthcare. The ‘court-decision trap’ has made cross border 
healthcare the binding law of the land, and the initial political will to roll back the Court has been 
replaced by a majority accepting the once unwanted outcome of judicial decision-making. The 
‘voice of law’ has been used strategically to shape preferences and promote consensus.   
 
IV. Court-decision trap II: ECJ Prerogative over the Definition of Social 
Minimum Benefits and their Exportability 
Social regulation in the European Community is as old as the Community itself. In order to realise 
the principle of workers’ free movement, a Regulation coordinating the social security rights across 
borders was adopted as early as 1958 and reformed in 1971.
11
  The regulation coordinates welfare 
rights when employed persons (now EU citizens) move and reside in a member state other than 
their own and constitutes an impressive, detailed and quite well-functioning cross-border social 
security co-ordination system.  
Article 4 of Reg. 1408/71 (now Reg. 883/2004) lists the social security benefits included, but 
explicitly states in Article 4 (4) that social assistance falls outside the material scope of the 
Regulation. The political rationale for tying social assistance to the nation state was, and still is, that 
it is different in nature from social security (van der Mei 2002) and should remain within the strict 
competencies of the member states. Social assistance was an important and indeed deliberate 
exemption to the member states also because it was seen as opposed to the functional idea of the 
regulation, which was to mobilise the labour force within the Community (not those receiving 
social assistance) (Holloway 1981). The historical context of the welfare model is important to note 
here since by 1971, the difference between (exportable) benefits of employer and employee 
financed social insurance, on the one hand, and social assistance financed via taxes (and hence 
related to the place of residence), on the other hand, was still clear cut for all of the original six 
founding EU states with their Bismarck style welfare systems. This was later blurred when 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK came in, where tax financed benefits are common in realms 
elsewhere covered by contributions-based social insurance. 
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 The first regulation adopted was Regulation No. 3, adopted by the Council on the 25
th
 September 1958 but later 
reformed as Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971. The regulation has recently been 
substantially reformed with the adoption of Regulation 883/2004 of 29
th
 April 2004.  
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The EU co-ordination scheme means that member states grant residing or working citizens from 
other member states access to their social security benefits and also to bring along social 
entitlements that they have earned in one member state to another. The Regulation is based on a 
principle of non-discrimination and exportability in order to establish and promote cross border 
mobility among EU citizens. It thus introduces an – albeit limited – principle of social sharing, as 
well as principles set to de-nationalise and de-territorialise welfare rights. The regulatory scheme 
has up to the Lisbon Treaty been closely guarded by unanimity decision-making rules, and reform 
attempts have been characterised by strong national preferences. Accessing welfare communities 
and exporting welfare rights earned have indeed been re-distributive questions of high political 
salience. 
Social assistance or social minimum benefits continue to rely on strongly tied nation-state logics of 
reasoning. To socially assist those who cannot provide for themselves through benefits in cash or in 
kind relies on a shared understanding of solidarity within a defined community. Social assistance 
constitutes the most direct form of redistributive policy. It transfers resources between members of 
society without making rights dependent on individual contributions. The political preferences 
regarding coordination of social assistance benefits within the European Union have been both clear 
and relatively fixed. Politicians generally, across member states and over time, have held that 
establishing who has the right to access minimum benefits and where such benefits are payable 
belongs to the repertoire of national competences and the EU should not interfere in such forms of 
national redistribution. However, despite clearly defined national preferences and unanimity, EU 
coordination of social minimum benefits has taken place. Today, accessibility and to some extent 
exportability of social minimum benefits constitute an important part of social Europe’s substantive 
contents.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the European Court of Justice began to challenge member states’ 
understanding of what could be excluded from the regulatory scope and progressively included 
more nationally defined social assistance benefits into the scope
12
. The member states became 
alarmed and argued that the ECJ had overstepped the competences of the Community and that the 
relevant social assistance kind of benefits fell outside the spirit and purpose of the Treaties 
(Verschueren 2007, Christensen & Malmstedt 2000; Martinsen 2005b). In 1992 - in a rare display 
of the strength of political preferences - the Council of Ministers managed to overrule the Court’s 
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 The more expansive interpretations include; case 1/72 Frilli; case 187/73 Callemeyn; case 63/76 Inzirillo; case 139/82 
Piscitello and joined cases 379 to 381/85 & 93/86 Giletti et al.   
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expansive interpretations.
13
 The Council adopted a Regulation which specified that certain benefits 
with characteristics between social security and social assistance should be made non-exportable to 
hosting member states. In this way, the Council overruled the Court on the facet of exportability, 
but the special rule at the same time specified that these “special non-contributory benefits” in the 
grey area between social security and social assistance were accessible in a host member state for 
the personal scope of the regulation. Correction of the Court’s decision-making throughout would 
have required a Treaty amendment, hence the governments yielded regarding one facet. 
For a benefit to be coordinated according to the special rule, it should be listed, by unanimous 
decision, in Annex IIa of the Regulation. One could argue that on the facet of exportability the 
member states had re-politised control and taught a lesson to the ECJ, but at the same time have had 
to accept cross border accessibility to these benefits.   
At first, the Court seemed to take the political correction of its expansionary course of integration 
into account, as confirmed the by subsequent cases of Snares
14
 and Partridge
15
. The specific 
regulatory scheme soon found its own expansionary dynamics, fed by politics. When the amending 
regulation was adopted, the benefits inserted in the Annex were still quite limited (Interview I, 
Commission Official, February 2007). Over time, the Annex, however, came to include a long list 
of minimum benefits and special benefits for disabled persons.
16
 The member state rationale for 
wanting to limit these benefits within the national borders was indeed politically highly important 
and was connected to two important on-going societal developments challenging the welfare state: 
a) pensioners moving to the South should not be able to export social benefits which were intended 
to support them in their home member state; and b) workers from Eastern Europe and their family 
members should not be able to export ‘generous’ benefits from north and continental Europe when 
returning to their own member state. In this way, the dispute addresses what should be the scope 
and limits of social responsibility and solidarity in a contemporary mobilised Europe.  
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 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1247/92 of 30 April 1992.. 
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 Case C-20/96, Snares, 4 November 1997. 
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 Case C-297/96, Partridge, 11 June 1998 
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 The annex included benefits such as income replacement allowance from Belgium; the Spanish minimum income 
guarantee, cash benefits to assist the elderly; the Irish unemployment assistance; the Italian social pensions for persons 
without means, social allowance; the Finnish special assistance for immigrants, the Swedish financial support for the 
elderly, the British income-based allowance for jobseekers, income support, etc. 
 
15 
 
The Commission was however dissatisfied with this new turn in the coordination system, arguing 
that it hindered the overall idea of welfare coordination, namely ensuring and promoting free 
movement for all – not only benefitting the more classic labour force. Back in 1998, the 
Commission had proposed a substantial reform of Regulation 1408/71, which among other 
objectives aimed to slim Annex IIa considerably and to return to a more consistent regulatory 
scheme with fewer exemptions.
17
 However, the negotiations were progressing slowly (Interview II, 
Commission official, February 2007). In particular, many member states vetoed taking their 
individual benefits out of Annex IIa. The difficult bargaining situation, loaded with divergent 
national interests, threatened to block the reform process as a whole. The situation came to a head 
around 2001 in relation to the negotiations on the acquis communautaire with the ten candidate 
countries. The first delegation to negotiate was the Czech Republic, and one demand from the 
candidate country was to have a long list of benefits inserted in Annex IIa (Interview I, Commission 
Official, February 2007).  
Just five days before the Commission negotiated with the Czech republic, the Court ruled on one of 
its ground-breaking cases. In the Jauch
18
 ruling and the later case of Leclere
19
 the Court ruled that 
although listed in the Annex, the Austrian long term care in Jauch and the Luxembourgian 
maternity allowances in Leclere had been incorrectly governed by the special rule and were indeed 
exportable according to Community law. 
The new rulings of the Court empowered the Commission in the negotiations with the candidate 
countries and – perhaps more importantly – towards the member states. When the Czech Republic 
came with its list of benefits to have inserted in the Annex, the Commission refused the demand 
with reference to the Jauch ruling (Interviews I and II, Commission Officials, February 2007). As a 
result of the new turn in judicial interpretations, the Commission could insist that the long list of 
special benefits needed to be amended, so that the same criteria that applied to established member 
states also applied to candidate countries. Leaning against the words of the Court, playing the card 
of ‘the voice of law’, the Commission regained its capacity to ‘nudge’ the Council (Genschel, this 
volume). After difficult negotiations, the Council and the European Parliament adopted another 
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 COM (1998) 779, proposed 21 December 1998.  
   
18
 Case C-215/99, Jauch, 8 March 2001. 
 
19
 Case C-43/99, Leclere, 31 May 2001. 
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amendment, Regulation 647/2005
20
. They introduced a new definition of special non-contributory 
benefits. As a result, the list of benefits was completely revised. Around 40 benefits were removed 
from the list (Interview I, Commission Official, February 2007). 
Despite supposed political codification of the Court’s interpretation, the Commission was still not 
satisfied (Verschueren 2007). The Commission could not accept that the UK disability living 
allowance, the attendance allowance and the carer’s allowance, the child care allowance of 
Finland and the Swedish disability allowance and care allowance for disabled children were still 
placed in the Annex. These three member states disagreed vigorously. 
Instead of taking each of the three member states to Court, the Commission chose to bring an 
annulment procedure against the Council and the European Parliament, in accordance with article 
230 of the Treaty. That is, the Commission requested the ECJ to annul the adopted Regulation 
647/2005, for having wrongly inserted the benefits mentioned above for the UK, Finland and 
Sweden in the Annex. This confrontational approach by the Commission caused significant uproar 
among the three affected member states. From having enjoyed considerable discretion in defining 
their own benefits as not exportable, the prospect of reduced autonomy was far from well received 
by the member states. The perhaps strongest reaction came from the UK which refused to bend its 
positions throughout the preliminary negotiations with the Commission and in the Council 
(Interview, UK Department of Work and Pension, March 2006). The UK maintained that the 
aforementioned benefits were special and non-contributory. Furthermore, the UK pointed out that 
the listing of the disability living allowance and the attendance allowance had already been 
approved by the Court in Snares and Partridge (para 50 of case C-299/05).  
The Court ruled on the annulment procedure in October, 2007.
21
 Like the Commission, the Court 
found that the benefits had been wrongly listed in the Annex, and should be made exportable 
according to the rules of the Regulation. 
                                                 
20
 Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 April 2005 amending Council 
Regulations (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed 
persons and to members of their families moving within the Community and (EEC) No 574/72 laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. 
 
21
 Case 299/05, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 18 October 2007. Commission of the European 
Communities v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. Action for annulment - Social security - 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 - Articles 4(2a) and 10a - Annex IIa - Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 - Special non-
contributory benefits.  
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In sum, the case on social assistance related benefits demonstrates that despite unanimity and strong 
political preferences to maintain control, social minimum benefits exportability has had its own 
course of European integration. In the longitudinal perspective, supranational hierarchical modes of 
decision-making continue to progress social Europe, even into the national most unpopular aspects 
of social sharing. When sequencing out what happens over time, it is clear that case-law 
interpretations have become considerable assets to the Commission. Furthermore, the patience, 
persistence and continuous presence of the Commission has helped to overcome long-running 
resistance to the “bits and pieces” of integration. Together the Court and Commission constitute a 
powerful tandem of supranational-hierarchical steering and non-political powers. The temporal 
study of the joint action of the Commission and Court shows that in the many detailed re-
interpretations of the scope and limits of the European idea, time is key to understanding exits from 
the joint decision-trap.
22
 In the long run, opposition to the voice of law is difficult to maintain, even 
where all governments agree on it, and isolated positions may become increasingly lonesome 
against the non-political powers of European integration, who hold the upper-hand of time and who 
represent the voice of the law. 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
From the outset of EU integration, social policy seemed a rather unlikely case for any supranational 
policy to develop. Nonetheless, this chapter highlighted that there are basically all exit mechanisms 
from the joint-decision trap at play even in this field where a lack of explicit action capacity for the 
EU, combined with unanimity requirements, for a long time created major hurdles for policy 
development. To summarise the policy development alongside the exit mechanisms elaborated in 
the conceptual chapter to this book, all cells can be filled with at least one example, if not a striking 
or several examples. 
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 We thank Miriam Hartlapp for pointing this out to us.  
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Table 1
23
: Exits from the joint-decision trap in EU social policy 
 POLITICAL AGREEMENT  
under the joint-decision mode  
facilitated by: 
 
SUPRANATIONAL-
HIERARCHICAL  
STEERING: 
 
 A) Change of 
applicable  
decision rules 
(Treaty base 
game, 
Arena shifting) 
B) Change of 
opportunity 
structure 
regarding the 
specific policy 
innovation 
(ECJ or CM 
reinterpret law, 
promotion of 
litigation) 
 
C) 
ECJ as a 
de facto 
policy-
maker 
D) 
COM as policy-
maker (only  in 
competition policy 
or financial 
programs) 
Prohibitions to 
ELIMINATE MARKET 
RESTRICTIONS 
(“market making”, 
“negative integration”) 
Relevant: 
harmonisation of 
e.g. company law 
and the related 
rights of workers 
Highly relevant: 
Commission interprets 
related ECJ decisions and 
uses the voice of law to 
nudge consensus in health 
services 
Highly 
relevant: e.g. 
cross-border 
patient 
mobility 
Rarely relevant 
competition policy 
aspects in “outer shell of 
welfare state” 
(Leibfried), e.g. 
employment offices 
 
Common activities to 
SHAPE THE MARKET  
 
Highly relevant: 
general working 
conditions as 
“health and safety at 
workplace” issues, 
Social partner 
agreements as EU 
directives 
Highly relevant:  
e.g. gender equality 
directives in 1970s and 
1980s 
Highly 
relevant: e.g. 
gender 
equality 
Relevant: Financing 
poverty programs, 
budget for Europ. works 
councils 
 
However, it is important to note that exiting the joint-decision trap via political agreement or 
supranational-hierarchical steering is no panacea. These mechanisms are often outrageously time 
consuming (see equal pay for women and men, section II in this chapter). Options for 
circumventing the Council are not equally distributed across various sub-fields but cluster in areas 
closer to the market (like services, now including health-related services) or regulated on the level 
of EU primary law (like equal pay, free movement of labour, etc.). Such “exits” may lead to only 
partial solutions since the ECJ decides basic features but typically further specifications or 
clarifications would be needed, be it in EU legislation or in later ECJ cases. The cases discussed 
above show that this is sometimes “exploited” by the governments in a delaying strategy based on 
the argument that each domestic system is just so different. However, this dangerous strategy can 
possibly divert them from effective self-defence by jointly overruling the Court, and it can be 
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 This table is based on the categories suggested by Fritz W. Scharpf during the second author workshop at EIF in 
Vienna, November 2009. 
19 
 
detrimental in the long run if the Court actually further reinforces its line with each ensuing national 
case. Finally, even the ECJ’s verdicts can at times be blocked on the level of practical 
implementation of EU law, such as in the much-quoted case of the Working Time Directive. Its 
provisions were interpreted in a worker-friendly way when the ECJ included on-call duties into the 
allowed maximum working time. However, this would have been very costly in practice and has so 
far not been realised in most member countries. To sum up, caution is in place regarding the final 
result of exits from EU decision traps. 
 
In any case, this chapter presented numerous examples for legislation brought about by the 
dynamics that allow exiting joint-decision traps. They come on top of the EU’s classic consensus-
promoting mechanisms which may help to reframe antagonistic national preferences in all 
international and, even more, supranational settings with continued interaction (re-defining issues to 
limit unwanted effects for some participants, socialisation effects of various variants, and external 
circumstances making consensus easier over time such as changes in government). But what is even 
more, social policy is an area where the governments repeatedly were confronted with a “court-
decision trap”, an extreme form of the joint-decision trap (see in detail Falkner 2011, conceptual 
chapter of this book): The ECJ decides on the basis of EU primary law and therefore, the EU 
institutions have no powers of revision under the policy-making procedures as provided in the 
Treaties. This may occur even against the will of all (!) of the governments and without prior 
political deliberation on the subject matter, as this chapter’s examples show. Most importantly, 
however, none of the escape mechanisms discussed in this book can work in such a case of joint-
decision trap since only a change of the very constitutional basis of EU cooperation, the Treaties, 
can possibly revise this specific kind of supra-national hierarchical decision of the ECJ. 
Note that in our two case studies outlined above, the story is not about a governmental stalemate at 
all. To the contrary, here the governments had even achieved consensus that they did not want 
something to be subject of EU social policy. Still, the ECJ did not hesitate to bring (at least facets 
of) this into its realm of authoritative decision-making. Facing this, the governments could only 
have gone for a Treaty revision as legal remedy, which would have been hard to manage even if 
they wanted. For pragmatic reasons, it seems, they did not even seriously attempt this but just tried 
to buy time (in healthcare, by holding that their systems are yet again different) or by taking 
selected (social assistance-related) benefits again out of the judgement’s realm of application via a 
simple secondary law solution (which was again stricken down by the Court). Furthermore, in the 
20 
 
case of health care the Court’s policy-making gradually came to impact on political negotiations, 
where the ‘voice of law’ has been used strategically by the Commission and presidency to shape 
national preferences and promote consensus. In both cases, a powerful tandem between 
Commission and Court, holding the upper hand of time and speaking the authoritative law of the 
land, has forwarded social integration to unexpected extent.   
What does this all signify in terms of the problem-solving potentials of European integration? One 
could venture the interpretation that even against all governments’ consensual intentions, some 
issues that were perceived as problem-solving gaps by individual citizens or patients were indeed 
made the subject of judicial legislation. This by far outperforms, in terms of supranational steering 
potentials, what stood to be expected. In many further cases, EU social policy managed to exit the 
joint-decision trap via more “traditional” pathways such as exit mechanisms (e.g. the Treaty-base 
game) and consensus-promoting mechanisms (e.g. watering down or opt-outs). However, it must be 
mentioned that these interesting examples are very interesting from the perspective of political 
scientists, and (selectively) beneficial from a social rights perspective. As indicated, however, this 
must not be taken to mean that there are no problem-solving gaps remaining. 
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